Walid Faris

Walid Faris
PhD Candidate in Finance
DRM, University of Paris Dauphine – PSL
Researcher in the Family Business and Long-Term Investment Chair
Assistant Teacher in Corporate Finance
Conducting thesis under the supervision of Mrs. Edith Ginglinger
Intersections of Corporate Control, Governance, Private Equity and Economic Impact

About Me

I am a second year PhD candidate in Finance at Paris Dauphine University - PSL and Researcher in the Family Business and Long-Term Investment Chair. Through empirical work utilizing administrative and commercial data, I explore questions related to Corporate Governance, Economic Impact, and Ownership Dynamics in finance. I work extensively with ownership databases, conducting cross-analyses and leveraging advanced econometric techniques to uncover insights into corporate behavior and outcomes.

Research

Working Papers

Competition and Productivity in the Middle East and Central Asia, 2025, with Etibar Jafarov and Umang Rawat

Description: This working paper studies the evolution of market competition in the Middle East and Central Asia and examines how trade protection and market-organization policy implementation shape firm-level market power and productivity. Using firm-level Orbis data for listed and unlisted firms, the analysis estimates production-function-based markups and markup-adjusted productivity gaps, and exploits import-weighted tariff measures at both country and sector levels together with institutional reform indicators. The empirical framework combines medium-run panel regressions and local projections to assess the impact of tariffs and competition policies on market power, and evaluates whether higher competition is associated with productivity growth.

Private Equity and Pre-Investment Ownership Structure, 2024

Abstract: We show that corporate control shapes the value-creation channel of private equity. Across 2,799 first private equity transactions in French firms over 1994-2023, minority investments that preserve incumbent control generate stronger growth and leverage responses than majority buyouts, but weaker profitability gains. This growth-profitability trade-off depends on pre-investment ownership. Minority structures are most effective in family-controlled firms, where they produce strong asset and debt growth with limited profitability costs and more favorable labor outcomes, consistent with private equity complementing incumbent management. In non-family firms, by contrast, minority investments induce expansion without sufficient operational discipline, making majority control more important for combining growth with profitability improvement. Private equity creates value through both capital provision and corporate control, and the relative importance of these channels depends on the governance environment at entry: minority PE is most effective when an incumbent controller remains in place, as in family firms, whereas majority control becomes more important when ownership is more dispersed.

Global Corporate Control: Mapping Ultimate Owners and Assessing Their Effects on Firms, 2024

Description: This paper documents the prevalence of family-controlled firms in France using a novel identification strategy that merges Orbis and Pappers ownership data. By combining manual reconstruction of complex control chains with algorithmic classification, we overcome limitations in standard databases, especially for unlisted firms with opaque structures. The dataset enables empirical analysis of how family control relates to firm characteristics and behavior.

Current Work: We are extending the methodology to the complete Orbis Historical Database to build a global country–year panel with refined Ultimate Owner classifications across all control types. This dataset will support cross-country regressions and time-series analysis to study how variations in ownership and control structures influence firm performance, investment, and market dynamics.